Nos. 119 and 120 VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE Legislative Assembly of British Columbia

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Ten o’clock a.m.

Prayers by Mr. Dalton.

The House proceeded to “Orders of the Day.”

Order called for Committee of Supply.

Pursuant to Sessional Order, order called for Section A of Committee of the Whole.

Pursuant to Sessional Order, order called for Section C of Committee of Supply.

Bill (No. 43) intituled FNCIDA Implementation Act was committed, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

On the motion for second reading of Bill (No. 53) intituled Family Day Act, a debate arose.

The debate continued.

The House divided.

Motion agreed to on the following division:

Yeas—74
Rustad
Reid
Thomson
Lekstrom
Yap
Yamamoto
McNeil
Chong
Lake
MacDiarmid
McRae
Letnick
Barnett
Lee
Sultan
Dalton
Hawes
Coell
Krueger
Heed
Cadieux
Polak
Coleman
Falcon
Bond
de Jong
Abbott
Hansen
Les
Hayer
Bloy
Cantelon
Bennett
Pimm
Hogg
Howard
Thornthwaite
James
S. Simpson
Corrigan
Horgan
Dix
Farnworth
Ralston
Kwan
Fleming
Lali
Popham
Brar
Donaldson
D. Routley
Stewart
Foster
Hammell
Trevena
Bains
Mungall
Karagianis
Chandra Herbert
Krog
Trasolini
Simons
O’Mahony
Fraser
B. Routley
Macdonald
Coons
Chouhan
Horne
Slater
Black
Thorne
Gentner
Sather
Nays—3
Huntington
B. Simpson
van Dongen

Bill (No. 53) read a second time and Ordered to be placed on the Orders of the Day for committal at the next sitting after today.

(In Committee — Section A)


Section A of Committee of the Whole reported progress on Bill (No. 54) intituled Provincial Sales Tax Act and asked leave to sit again.

Bill to be considered at the next sitting.

Committee to sit again at the next sitting.

(In Committee — Section C)


Section C of Committee of Supply reported progress of the estimates of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.

Report to be considered at the next sitting.

Committee to sit again at the next sitting.

And then the House adjourned at 11.54 a.m.

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

One-thirty o’clock p.m.

Order called for “Members’ Statements.”

Order called for “Oral Questions by Members.”

The Hon. B. Barisoff (Speaker) tabled the Ombudsperson Annual Report, 2011/12.

The Hon. K. Falcon (Minister of Finance and Deputy Premier) tabled the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) Annual Report, 2011.

The Hon. S. Bond (Minister of Justice and Attorney General) tabled the following documents:

Forest Appeals Commission Annual Report, 2011;

Environmental Appeal Board Annual Report, 2010/2011; and,

Crown Proceeding Act Report for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2011.

Mr. Farnworth presented a petition regarding inhumane treatment of dogs.

The House proceeded to “Orders of the Day.”

By leave, the Hon. R. Coleman moved —

That the revision of the Insurance Act (RSBC 1996 c. 226) be presented to the Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct, Standing Orders and Private Bills for examination and recommendation pursuant to the Statute Revision Act.

Motion agreed to.

By leave, the Hon. R. Coleman moved —

That notwithstanding the motion adopted on October 3, 2011 regarding the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts, a Special Committee be appointed to unanimously recommend to the Legislative Assembly the appointment of an Auditor General, pursuant to section 2 of the Auditor General Act (SBC 2003, c. 2). The said Special Committee shall have the powers of a Select Standing Committee and in addition is empowered:

a) to appoint of their number, one or more subcommittees and to refer to such subcommittees any of the matters referred to the Committee;

b) to sit during a period in which the House is adjourned, during the recess after prorogation until the next following Session and during any sitting of the House;

c) to adjourn from place to place as may be convenient; and

d) to retain such personnel as required to assist the Committee;

and shall report to the House as soon as possible, or following any adjournment, or at the next following Session, as the case may be; to deposit the original of its reports with the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly during a period of adjournment and upon resumption of the sittings of the House, the Chair shall present all reports to the Legislative Assembly.

The said Special Committee shall be composed of Members Eric Foster (Convener), John Les and Ralph Sultan, and Bruce Ralston and Kathy Corrigan.

Motion agreed to.

Order called for Committee of Supply.

Pursuant to Sessional Order, order called for Section A of Committee of the Whole.

Pursuant to Sessional Order, order called for Section C of Committee of Supply.

Bill (No. 35) intituled Pharmaceutical Services Act was committed, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

(In Committee — Section A)


Section A of Committee of the Whole reported progress on Bill (No. 54) intituled Provincial Sales Tax Act and asked leave to sit again.

Bill to be considered at the next sitting.

Committee to sit again at the next sitting.

(In Committee — Section C)


Section C of Committee of Supply reported progress of the estimates of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.

Bill to be considered at the next sitting.

Committee to sit again at the next sitting.

And then the House adjourned at 6.22 p.m.

HON. BILL BARISOFF, Speaker

NOTICE OF BILLS

Wednesday, May 30

Mr. Dix to introduce a Bill intituled Cosmetic Use of Pesticides Control Act, 2012.

NOTICE OF QUESTIONS

Wednesday, May 30

12  Mr. Gentner to ask the Hon. Minister of Jobs, Tourism and Innovation and the Hon. Minister of Transportation and Infrastructure the following questions: —

1. Can the government explain its current policy regarding its position that supports or oppose a foreign trade zone (FTZ) strategy?

2. Will a Foreign Trade Zone be an effective tool to improve the competitiveness of North American locations in the global supply chain economy?

3. What type of economic activity will be encouraged by a foreign trade zone for British Columbia?

4. Will the economic activity within a FTZ include: apparel, automotive, technology, food processing, and warehousing, distribution and manufacturing?

5. What other economic activities does the government envision through the creation of a FTZ?

6. In the report, commissioned by both ministries: Feasibility of a British Columbia Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) Program, (hereby referred to as the Report) it refers to value-added activity due to a FTZ in BC, can the government explain what value added activity will occur?

7. The government paid $76,785 for the report — did the government get value?

8. How does value-added industry occur within a Foreign Trade Zone?

9. How many value-added businesses will be generated with a FTZ in BC?

10. The report does not “give quantitative answers to the number” of new businesses and investments will be attracted to BC due to a Foreign Trade Zone — why?

11. The main premise of the Report is based primarily on competing with the United States economy — why didn’t the report broaden its scope and address competitiveness throughout the world market?

12. Is the premise of a FTZ for BC is of partially finished goods completed and customized locally, prior to formal entry into United States economy?

13. How many completed and customized goods will be for the domestic economy?

14. What advantages to BC are there when FTZ goods are already exported and assembled and re-exported within United States?

15. The report states that FTZ “policy has been so effective that some goods from overseas destined to the Canadian market” are processed in US FTZs” — does the Ministries have proof to show that this would not have happened with or without a FTZ in British Columbia or elsewhere?

16. Can the ministries explain how much economic activity has been lost to BC because of FTZ’s located in the United States?

17. The Report states: “despite Canada’s favorable geographic location … our innate advantages have not be enough to offset the complexity and more restrictive elements of the existing Canadian foreign trade zone programs.” — Can the ministries explain what British Columbia’s “innate advantages” are?

18. The Report states: “in BC and elsewhere in the country there is a currently a high-level interest in reforming the FTZ policy and the federal government has indicated its willingness to review and possibly simplify and enhance the programs” — Where is this interest coming from?

19. What interests are behind the major stakeholders lobby for a FTZ?

20. The report refers to the federal government as initiating the marketing of FTZ opportunities as part of its “Gateway Initiative” — The government of British Columbia is a member of the Gateway Initiative, how much marketing for a FTZ has currently occurred by the government?

21. What laws will be changed in order to accommodate a FTZ in BC?

22. Will harmonized provincial-federal laws come into effect such as environmental, labour and health in order to accommodate a BC FTZ?

23. The Report states that all laws of the land will be “fully applied, including those of labor, health, environment and immigration.” — How will the province enforce such laws?

24. Will FTZ zoning laws be governed by the host municipality or by a different agency?

25. Within a FTZ, will property assessments be driven by current practices of BC Assessment offices including comparative analyses of similar property values, or will the government selectively drive assessments on a case by case basis?

26. If the province lowers industrial property taxes, in order to accommodate a FTZ, will the province compensate property tax revenue losses to affected municipalities?

27. If a FTZ application is for lands located on the Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR), will the applicant have to follow Agricultural Land Commission procedures and conduct public hearings?

28. How much ALR land will be needed to facilitate the industrial land capacity for a FTZ?

29. Will a FTZ be seen as a federal agency that can override provincial legislation including the ALC?

30. If the Asia-Pacific Gateway mandate is to assemble land within the ALR, how will the government accommodate that mandate?

31. Or has the Ministry consulted the Ministry of Agriculture to see how this can be accommodated?

32. How much of a determinant is cheap agricultural land play in the assembly of land to accommodate a FTZ?

33. Will the HST or PST be deferred until goods enter the domestic commerce?

34. Will any provincial taxes be reduced in order to accommodate FTZ’s?

35. What other taxes and charges will be deferred in a FTZ?

36. If products stored or produced within a FTZ and exported out of BC and Canada, why would taxes not apply?

37. Can the Ministry report on FTZ’s that have failed?

38. What percentage of temporary foreign workers would be employed within a BC FTZ?

39. Within a FTZ how many workers would be from BC and how many would be from the immediate community?

40. The Report examined potential FTZ scenarios, based on the two major existing BC Gateways (Vancouver and Prince Rupert) provide transportation logistics services. The first being the southern “Vancouver” scenario that includes Port Metro Vancouver and the Vancouver International Airport: Can the ministries prove that over $78 billion in incremental goods will be generated within a “Vancouver” FTZ scenario?

41. Where would the Port Metro Vancouver FTZ be located?

42. Would it be specifically located within the lower mainland?

43. Would the lower mainland FTZ be found contiguous within a defined boundary or would it be scattered in various places throughout the lower mainland?

44. Will the same regulations apply for all FTZ’s in BC or would regulations and laws be granted to various FTZ’s on a case by case basis?

45. Intermodal facilities such as Prince George and the Interior have been discussed, by the Province and the Federal government, what are the linkages among port FTZ’s and non-port located FTZ’s?

46. Would separate FTZ’s be governed as separate entities, or adjoined to their related port-intermodal interfaces?

47. The Report specifically talks about the Vancouver, Prince Rupert and Prince George FTZ’s, but make no mention of other potential FTZ’s located elsewhere in the province — Why?

48. Has the province considered interior locations such as Kamloops, Cache Creek, and Ashcroft for FTZ’s?

49. Will the Ministry conduct a location study in order to determine where a FTZ will be located?

50. What are the location dynamics in considering a FTZ in BC?

51. What type of consultative process will be conducted with the host municipality of a FTZ?

52. Can a municipality that is opposed to a FTZ, be able to reject such a proposal?

53. Can the government show proof to substantiate the Report position that a Vancouver FTZ scenario will generate 3100 person-years of employment?

54. In the northern BC FTZ scenario, can the government substantiate how many jobs will be generated for FTZ’s located in Prince Rupert and Prince George?

55. The report suggests that the Port of Prince Rupert and Prince George Airport would “on a combined basis over $610 million in incremental goods would be handled annually” because of a FTZ scenario — does the government agree?

56. Can the government explain what the Report says are “implementations for government revenues?”

57. What would a “structured properly updated FTZ” (Report: p. iv) look like?

58. Can the government provide evidence to support the Report notion that “if structured properly, an updated foreign trade zone policy would cause no displacement of any existing BC economic activity”?

59. Has the government estimated what current industries and businesses could be displaced or closed because of a FTZ?

60. Can government explain which businesses outside of the FTZ will be treated differently than those inside a FTZ?

61. The Report asserts that the taxes on FTZ businesses may not be any different than those businesses currently located in existing non-FTZ industrial areas — How would a FTZ entice businesses to locate in a BC FTZ?

62. In its executive summary, the Report says: “Rather, a revised FTZ program would only generate new economic activity for BC — activity that would otherwise be located overseas or in a United States foreign trade zone” — Why would a company located outside a foreign trade zone support a FTZ?

63. The Report states: “An enhanced federal FTZ program would not fundamentally change the competitive balance between domestic firms and firms locating to a Canadian FTZ.” How can the reduction of property taxes benefit municipalities whose major revenue is dependent on property taxes?

64. Can the government explain what is a “enhanced federal foreign trade zone program”? How would a FTZ change the competitive balance between domestic and foreign firms?

65. How can the reduction of property taxes benefit municipalities whose major revenue is dependent on property taxes?

66. The Report suggests there are no guarantees of success with a foreign trade zone: “If successful, it would increase employment opportunities”; Will the government continue to spend money on reports and develop policy on implementation of a FTZ in BC if there are no assurances of success?

67. The Report then goes on to say: “to corroborate this, interviews with US FTZ operators confirmed that no discernible displacement of domestic business had occurred within their FTZs.” Will the government seek advice through interviews with potential affected communities re the displacement of domestic businesses by an independent research firm with no attachment or prior consultative work with industries within a FTZ?

68. Why has not the government ascertained the views of affected communities regarding the implications behind a FTZ located near or within their community?

69. Why is there no independent analysis, views from those outside of the operations of FTZ who commented and given a reasonable arms length response relative to the effectiveness of a FTZ — why?

70. What are the socio-economic implementations of a FTZ within a community and adjacent regions?

71. Why is this Report garnered with the terms of reference that is driven by the interests of industries lobbying for a FTZ?

72. The authors of the report referred to the National Association of Foreign Trade Zones that state that it has attracted economic activity that would otherwise be overseas or “would’ve been located in Canada”. Does the government have substantial proof to show that such economic activity would’ve been located in Canada if there is a similar FTZ located in British Columbia?

73. Can the government explain what economic activity is not desirable within a FTZ?

74. What is the capital, operational and maintenance costs of infrastructure within a FTZ?

75. Will FTZ partners contribute towards capital costs?

76. How much infrastructural costs for developing a FTZ would be borne by the taxpayers?

77. The Report states: “governments would collect income, payroll and other taxes from operations it would otherwise not happen within Canada, and continue to collect existing taxes and duties on activity outside FTZ.” (Report p. v) Can the government project what taxes, payroll and other taxes will be collected within a FTZ?

78. Why didn’t the Report look at the pros and cons between FTZ tax deferment and decreases versus the anticipated increase in revenue from taxes from operations that would occur from businesses that would exist in BC without locating in a FTZ?

79. On page 5 of the summary in the Report: “We estimate that the medium employment scenario for Vancouver will generate $29 million incremental federal tax revenue and $8 million incremental provincial tax revenue”. How did InterVISTAS reach these medium employment scenario figures?

80. The report speculates that the province will receive $8 million in incremental tax revenue but does not consider the costs relative to expenditures of producing a FTZ — why?

81. Will environmental assessments for areas within the FTZ be conducted by the federal government, provincial government, or through a “harmonization” of both federal and provincial assessment legislation?

82. Will a FTZ adhere to Metro Vancouver’s regional strategic planning processes?

83. How much weight will the Fraser River Estuary Management Plan hold regarding the implementation of a FTZ along the foreshore of the Fraser River?

84. Will a FTZ have to fit within a municipality’s zoning and official area plans?

85. The Report states: “If anything, revised FTZ policy could help reduce regional disparities, a smaller center could more effectively attract activity from foreign locations.” Can the government explain how this will be achieved?

86. The Report suggests that “enhancements” in a FTZ can help make British Columbia competitive. Such things as “business tax credits, the international finance center, agreements such as the trade investment and Labour Mobility Agreement, and New West Partnership Trade Agreement that have removed unnecessary impediments to trade investment labor mobility”. Does the government believe that the above mentioned enhancements are not enough to make BC competitive?

87. What must the province do with the federal and municipal governments in order to make a “successful” FTZ?

88. Does the province anticipate working with the federal government in order to establish a single window application FTZ process?

89. How much sovereignty and authority will the province give up in order to create a federal application process for FTZ’s?

90. Will such an application process involve the host municipality, and what recourse will a municipal council have if it opposes the application?

91. According to the Report, the federal government has indicated that a single window, a single integrated application approach, would eventually be adopted: How much discussion has the province had with the federal government to achieve this?

92. Report states: “BC could facilitate the application process for prospective tenants, effectively offering a single window package to prospective investors and operators”. Can the government explain what a single window package entails and under whose authority will this be undertaken?

93. In order to undertake strategic advocacy for an “improved” federal FTZ program, the report states the following: “the federal government is initiating a review of its foreign trade zone and the government BC could advocate to the federal government the need for policy changes”. What policy changes are currently underway?

94. Has the province advocated to the federal government in support of a FTZ?

95. Has the provincial government has sent the InterVISTAS report to the federal government for information or comment?

96. When does the province expect a reply regarding the Report’s recommendations?

97. Why was not the Report tabled in the Legislature?

98. The Report declares: “Goods when enter from overseas, have value added in the FTZ with local labor providing some form of value added goods processing.” How does the province assure value added in a FTZ when the government’s economic platform is one of free trade?

99. On page vi of the Report: “The provincial government may wish to selectively match incentives offered by the US state and/or local governments to level the playing field”. What exactly is the meaning of a level playing field?

100. How will selective incentives be determined, by legislation or by an order in council?

101. Will the province arbitrarily determine what local government incentives will be used to “level the playing field”?

102. The Report articulates: “The key here is that the FTZ specific incentives would be targeted to attract economic activity.” Who and what authority within government do the targeting?

103. The Report expresses: “Such incentives should not be a mechanism by which existing firms can avoid/defer payment of taxes as this trade could distort incentives for existing activity to relocate from one BC or Canadian community to another”. Why would the government support a notion that non-FTZ firms not be able to avoid or defer payment of taxes, while FTZ firms can?

104. The report considers several types of FTZ incentives that could be considered include:

• Financing of any bond posting requirements — Under which ministry and how would it be included in the budget?

• Trade bank financing or insurance on export receivables — Why would the government consider this?

• Working capital finance for exports — Would this be a federal initiative or provincial?

• Temporary relief from provincial corporate income taxes for a short term as the firm establishes itself in BC — How long is temporary relief? How long will a firm need to establish itself? What guarantee will there be within a FTZ that the temporary relief from taxes could not turn into become permanent?

• Reduction of Hydro rates within a FTZ — Why aren’t similar incentives given to the general public and ratepayers to reduce Hydro rates in order to increase productivity and businesses at home, outside a FTZ?

• Infrastructure financing — Why would infrastructure be financed by the general public when infrastructure for a FTZ is for FTZ corporations only, with tax incentives?

105. The Report expresses: “Another common incentive in some US foreign trade zones is the reduction or elimination of property taxes.” How will Transit and other agencies foster projects and operations without financing from FTZs?

106. Would legislation or cabinet decide the property tax rate in FTZs?

107. The Report states: “Reducing property taxes as a provincial would need to be considered carefully” — In the post HST referendum era, how much consultation would occur before deciding this taxation measure?

108. The Report continues: “Transitional property tax relief for new businesses can be a powerful economic development tool but it must be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis.” Can the government explain what is meant by “transitional property tax relief”?

109. Transitional tax relief based on a “case by case basis” within a FTZ is decided by which authority and what are the criteria given for selection of transitional tax relief?

110. Does transitional tax relief imply that one municipality may have to render lower property taxes as opposed to another?

111. The Report ascertains: “If the new business attracted to a FTZ is truly incremental economic activity to the region, and if it would be located on land that is currently not part of the tax base, there would be a net benefit to the community.” Can the Ministries explain which land is not currently “part of the tax base”?

112. Is the government’s rationale for a FTZ based on the premise that any property tax increase, outside a FTZ, however slight, justifies the need for a FTZ?

113. Does different economic activity other than non-FTZ industrial sectors such as agriculture mean it is a benefit to the community the FTZ is located or for British Columbia in general?

114. The report states that foreign trade zones could reduce existing tax revenues: “However, granting property tax relief on existing tax paying lands may reduce the existing use with backspace if a foreign trade zone activity displaces existing taxpaying operations. If considered at all, property tax relief would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis” — who or what authority has the power to waive property taxes within a FTZ?

115. The Report suggests that the provincial government should “consider more trade missions, including industrial participation in trade missions, the development of trade show booths and collateral materials, and promotion of BC FTZ overseas — How much is this already being done?

116. How much does the government plan to spend re the promoting FTZ’s oversees?

117. How much the marketing of FTZ’s will be conducted by the private sector?

118. The Report expresses: “The provincial and local governments could offer funds to match federal funding of foreign trade zone marketing to prospective tenants overseas.” How much will marketing and promoting FTZ’s cost the province?

119. Will the marketing and promoting strategy of FTZ’s rest with the province or the federal government?

120. On page 7 of the executive summary, the Report also states: “In order to send a consistent message and develop the BC brand, this will be more effective if done in conjunction with major BC stakeholders.” Who are the major BC stakeholders of the foreign trade zone? Is it exclusively Gateway partners?

121. Why should the province pay for the marketing support for private industry?

122. The Report goes on to say: “Another option for tracking these operations to BC is to offer marketing assistance to BC FTZ tenants.” How much is the government expected to subsidize FTZ tenants?

123. Is this not a form of corporate welfare?

124. The Report discloses: “This could be in the form of direct financial support for certain marketing activities.” — What is meant by “certain marketing activities”?

125. Can the government explain anticipated direct marketing activity costs, and indirect marketing costs for FTZ funding?

126. The Report reveals that: BC needs “to provide input and guidance in the development of the policy” towards the development of FTZ’s in BC. Which Ministry’s are involved with the federal government to implement FTZ policy? Will the Premier’s and Intergovernmental Relations play a part in this policy formation?

127. Can the government provide calendars of meetings and all correspondence among stakeholders and the Government of Canada regarding discussions relative to a FTZ policy and strategy for BC?

128. In its Executive Summary conclusion, the Report conveys: “The key issue of the development of a single window access service whereby foreign trade zone applicants can deal with a single point person to handle all government issues regardless of source” — Is this referring to a single window for all governments?

129. The Request for Proposals was jointly issued by the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Investment on February 22, 2011, seeking “to determine the feasibility of establishing a Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) program in British Columbia. One of the RFP calls was for primary research into “The potential benefits and losses to the province and the country associated with an FTZ program in B.C.”. Did the province get value for money regarding a fair evaluation of the benefits and losses of a FTZ program for BC?

130. Another aspect of the RFP was to look at “Advantages and disadvantages of a location-specific FTZ in British Columbia vs. province-wide FTZ programs”. Did the province receive a thorough examination of all potential location specifics and dynamics re the advantages and disadvantages of placement?

131. Under section 1.1 of the Report, the purpose states that modern supply chains provide overseas firms with many options to structure operations to use the North American Free Trade Agreement marketplace. Does the government support the notion that NAFTA feeds the need for supply chain in foreign trade zones and can a foreign trade zone exist without NAFTA?

132. Does the government have evidence to support the claim: “In many ways, overseas production and rotation into the NAFTA countries, Canada, Mexico, and United States, is the simplest chain supply chain approach for overseas manufacturers”?

133. The Report continues: “This, however, may not be the least cost logistics solution. In many cases, it may be more effective to do final assembly and customization activities in North America, and then ship to the final destination.” What is the effect of domestic FTZ’s when overseas manufacturers’ economies are depressed?

134. The Report says that a British Columbia FTZ will beat the Americans “inverted tariff” duties on parts” – Can the government assure the Legislature that the US will not make changes to its own tariff and duty systems within its FTZ’s in competition with BC FTZ’s?

135. Will the American FTZ be able to create a custom-made tax free FTZ that will out-compete BC FTZ’s?

136. The Report suggests that Canada and/or British Columbia can also serve the US market as a location for final assembly and customization. Can the government show how viable such a FTZ operation will be able to achieve this?

137. With respect to FTZ capabilities, the Report states on page 2: “The limited success of Canadian locations in attracting these types of value added activities is partially due to poor understanding of what is possible.” Can the government explain what is meant by poor understanding?

138. What public relations strategies will the government employ and what expenditures are involved to educate the public?

139. The Report states: “Stakeholders such as Canada’s ports and airports have long maintained the need for improved, invigorated Canadian FTZ program.” How long have stakeholders, including the government, crown corporations and agencies, including the Ministry of Transportation been advocating for a FTZ?

140. What exactly is an “invigorated Canadian FTZ program?”

141. The Report cites: “There is currently a high level of interest in the concept of a FTZ in BC and elsewhere in the country”. Can the government explain what represents a “high level of interest in a FTZ?

142. How much high level of interest for a FTZ is tied to the Asia-Pacific Gateway program?

143. Can the government list all federal government departments, municipal governments and First Nations whereby it has requested cooperation and consultation regarding the implementation of a FTZ?

144. Can the government explain what is meant by a “true foreign trade zone”?

145. Within the following context as seen in the Report: “The government of BC needs to better understand the potential gains and losses should the federal government establish a new foreign trade zone program” – What are the losses should a FTZ is established?

146. What is the “core principle of a FTZ”?

147. The Report refers to the core principle accordingly: “For some the theme has been trade globally, work and prosper locally” – Who are the “some” that support this as a core principle?

148. The Report assumes that: “The basic objective of foreign trade zone is to attract economic committee that would otherwise take place overseas or at other locations.” Does the government believe that all economic activity spun through a FTZ is good for BC?

149. Can the government name economic activities within a FTZ that may not be in the general interest of British Columbia?

150. The purpose of a FTZ is to “simplify complex regulations and administrative burden that discourages trade.” Can the government show how much deregulation will be induced through a FTZ and that it is in the best interest of the people of BC?

151. The Report states: “Canada is the only G8 country, and one of the only seven of the 29 organization for economic cooperation and development states, without active foreign trade zones.” How is it that while Canada and British Columbia claim to be doing quite well during the economic crisis worldwide that the government is adopting models of FTZs from countries that continue to have trade deficits and is still in recession?

152. On page 5, the Report refers to merchandise that will never enter domestic commerce and will be exclusively exported to another country with “no duties or taxes paid on those items” — Is this a means to that end whereby a FTZ is a separate economic state within British Columbia?

153. How encompassing will the FTZ be and where will it be located?

154. What on-going discussions have occurred among the provincial government and third parties such as private organizations, corporations, and other agencies regarding location of FTZ’s in BC?

155. With respect to goods that are to be value-added, the Report states: “This processing might include activities such as final assembly … Manufacturing, etc.” — How certain is the government that a FTZ will trigger value-added industry when the Report says that a FTZ “might” trigger value added industry?

156. The Report accordingly states “These finished goods are then exported to foreign markets, or they enter domestic commerce. If the finished goods are exported, then no duties or taxes are due” — Is this implying that goods produced British Columbia for export and is to be shipped, for example to the United States, will bear no taxes?

157. Do the above statements imply that duties and taxes will be charged by the US government and tax revenue will go to the USA and not Canada?

158. If finished goods are not to be taxed, what benefit is a foreign trade zone to the people British Columbia?

159. Page 6 of the Report says: “FTZs do not include exemption from environmental or labor law, immigration regulations, environmental and health regulations, income taxes, etc. All taxes of Canada — federal, provincial and local — would apply to activity within the BC foreign trade zone.” Does this imply that all laws and statutes cannot be reformed to accommodate the needs of a foreign trade zone?

160. Some foreign trade zones, especially in the United States, enjoy reduced or total exemption from local property taxes (p. 6). Realizing the reduction of property taxes for current port related activities, what reduction of property taxes would occur in order to make a FTZ successful?

161. Can the government guarantee that there will be no exemptions of laws or income tax, etc. to accommodate a FTZ?

162. If a foreign trade zone reduces property taxes, will the province consult and achieve permission by a host municipal government?

163. Will a FTZ offer wage subsidies? If so, will these be federal or provincial programs?

164. Can the government describe what a wage subsidy is within a FTZ?

165. Will labour safety, wage and benefit standards be different within a FTZ as compared to elsewhere in BC?

166. The Report refers to: “sweeteners” as a matter of “local decision”: What are “sweeteners” and are local decisions conducted by an authority within a FTZ or the host municipality?

167. The Report declares: “The concept of a FTZ is one of facilitating trade, typically including temporary duty and sales excise tax relief in jobs and investment that would otherwise take place overseas or country.” — Can the government please explain the meaning of temporary tax relief?

168. How long is a temporary tax relief envisioned — six months, a year, or two years, etc.? Who, or what, authority determines its longevity?

169. The FTZ model recommended in the Report is to be exclusively non-sovereign foreign trade zones: “This model views United States goods in the FTZ as being temporarily exempt from duty and taxes, but all lands laws of land applied. “What exactly is the difference between a sovereign and nonsovereign foreign trade zone?

170. Does a temporary exemption from duty and tax laws determine the difference between a temporary non-sovereign foreign trade zone and a sovereign foreign trade zone?

171. The Report implies that all laws of land will apply; however, how will this apply when tax laws are changed within a FTZ?

172. With the US market having a larger critical mass than Canada, can the government show evidence that a BC FTZ will work in parallel with the US?

173. If goods enter the US through a BC FTZ, how will domestic retailers capture the market advantage?

174. If goods enter the US through a BC FTZ, whereby US duties will apply, how will that deter cross-border shopping?

175. How much more border infrastructure improvements would be necessary to assist in higher cross-border activity due to a FTZ in BC?

176. The Report asserts that US FTZs act as “proxies” for the activity that could occur in BC; how can a US FTZ act as a proxy when the US dictates the continental market?

177. FTZ status is granted by the Trade Zone Board in United States to a grantee, typically a public or public type Corporation, for example, port authorities, cities, … economic not development organization or others.” What type of public corporation would act as a grantee?

178. Would accountability and transparency come under the scrutiny of the provincial Auditor General?

179. The Report suggests that: “A foreign trade zone board does not oversee day-to-day operations; operational responsibility rests with the grantee.” Does this imply that foreign trade zones will be deregulated?

180. The Report, on page 8 states: “Users of foreign trade zones must apply for, and complete, a rigorous application process and pay fees associated with applications.” — What does rigorous mean? How are these grant applications governed? Are they governed by the federal government, or by the local government, or by the provincial government?

181. In the Report, InterVISTAS says that according to senior staff members of the US FTZ boards, “potential impact of foreign trade zone activities of domestic suppliers is examined closely in every application, and any evidence of a possible negative effect would lead the board to restrict or disapprove the application.” — What is meant by “negative’?

182. Why would a FTZ board have an interest in the general needs of public disapproval that would restrict an application? Why would a negative aspect of a FTZ be conducted and concluded outside the public interest?

183. Why isn’t the Report more analytical and comparative rather than relying on perspectives by US FTZ board reviews?

184. The Report states: “Zone activities are clearly defined and can range from storage, assembly, processing, manufacturing distribution, all of which have undergone and are subject to continued public interest reviews.” — What are these public interest reviews?

185. Are these public interest reviews FTZ board driven or are they driven by an independent third party that has a direct mandate from the public?

186. In a FTZ, what is considered a domestic market? What will be used to measure a goods’ place of origin? What review system will be used to monitor goods and their origin?

187. In the FTZ application process, there is to be a public hearing process where comments are made — how much authority does government have to overthrow the application based upon negative comments made by public?

188. How many stakeholders and public interests will be represented at the FTZ application process hearings?

189. In the report, the application process so far looks a general-purpose FTZ only — why?

190. If there are needed amendments or changes to the proponent’s application, why is there no public appeal process?

191. What authority decides whether a public appeal process will be optional or non-optional?

192. If through the FTZ application process the findings appear favorable towards the establishment of a FTZ, why is there no public appeal process available?

193. The Report states: “FTZs are secure not only by clearly defining secured boundaries within US Customs oversight, but inventories recorded and controlled by using computer-based software that is reviewed by US customers.” Tracking will be conducted by what agency? What are the costs for monitoring? How much of the costs will the province endure?

194. “FTZs are usually are able to file only one entry summary per week rather than file a separate report each time a good-unit is brought into the foreign trade zone” — Will the streamlining procedure be conducted by a private company or by the government?

195. According to the Alternate Site Framework, it appears as though the FTZ will have governing authority. The Report avows: “Users will no longer have to apply for sub-zone status, and a local FTZ can enact a user-driven area of land that is off-site, yet covered in the FTZ.” — Does this not involve stewardship by the governing body of the FTZ to have almost limitless expansionist means?

196. How critical was is the InterVISTAS Report regarding the assessment of the criminal activity in existing US West Coast foreign trade zones?

197. Which policing and firefighting jurisdictions will be responsible for the security and enforcement within a FTZ?

198. How extensive was the data used in its comparative analysis on what the Report dubbed “successful FTZs”?

199. Does the government agree that telephone interviews with stakeholders within competitive FTZ are the basis for objectivity?

200. The Report looked at the dollar value throughput and also collected data on total cargo and TE use handling at relevant ports and airports, but nothing on community infrastructure and community input — why?

201. Many recommendations were made in the Report, and yet the authors say, “Consistent, verifiable, detailed the public data was largely unavailable (p. 35)” — How substantial are recommendations that are based on inconsistent, doubtful and inaccessible information?

202. In the Report, why is there no information provided regarding economic, social and/or environment for communities within and communities adjacent to FTZs?

203. The Report uses “regression analysis” — why?

204. The Report states: “The purpose for countries to locate within a FTZ is varied and benefits differ according to location.” Does this mean, that there is no viable location study available for establishing FTZs?

205. In assessing the potential impact of FTZ, the Report “created low, medium, and high case scenarios that reflect differing assumptions experience of US foreign trade zones.” — Can the government explain what those assumptions are?

206. According to the Report: “These scenarios have been built using 95% confidence intervals to capture the potential spread in outcomes.” — Does the government rely on this subjective use of confidence intervals to capture the potential for FTZ development in British Columbia?

207. Where will foreign trade zones be located in BC?

208. FTZ development as outlined in the Report were “built upon three key elements: total foreign trade zone throughput volume in dollars, the number of employees in each foreign trade zone, the total dollar value throughput of trade in corresponding trade districts as a FTZ included in the analysis” — Why didn’t the government adopt a triple bottom line approach?

209. The Report calculated dollar value throughput per employee in each FTZ: “This approach allows the analysis to capture the diverse nature of FTZ operations sizes, while being able to represent the overall trends that identified in the US context.” — Can the government explain what the economic trends that justify a foreign trade zone are?

210. The Report says: “Regression analysis was not appropriate to employ given the limited number of observations.” — Without regression analysis, how reliable is this Report relative to the limited number of observations made?

211. The Report states: “The approach recognizes the underlying relationship that exists between labor and capital inputs producing output and merchandise” — Does this imply that there will be no fair wage guidelines within a FTZ? (p. 36)

212. How closely is the provincial government working with the federal government regarding the establishment of a FTZ in BC?

213. The Report consistently refers to Port Metro Vancouver as BC’s primary southern gateway. Can the government give more specific information on where in the Lower Mainland FTZs will be located?

214. The government supports the strategies of the Asia-Pacific Gateway and the assembly of land within the Lower Mainland in order to fulfill the desire for a FTZ; which Ministry is mandated to purchase land for Port Metro Vancouver industrial capacity?

215. How much land purchase is foreseen by the government of BC to fulfill the need of a FTZ?

216. The Report estimates that with a FTZ within the vicinity of Port Metro Vancouver there will be a $5.1 billion throughput: Does the government agree with this estimate?

217. The Report uses “the same methodology as applied” in ascertaining successes of FTZs for Prince Rupert and Prince George — How can the government compare logistics and location-dynamics of Prince Rupert and Prince George with the high real estate values found in the Lower Mainland?

218. Recently the Mayor of Ashcroft suggested that he has been in consultation the provincial government relative to the push for intermodal capacity in that area. Can the government provide all correspondence, reports and memos pertaining to intermodal capacity and discussions with the Village of Ashcroft?

219. The Report says that foreign trade zones, and adjacent areas, are having difficulty achieving goals of employment generation (p. 38); if this is the case, why does the government embrace a foreign trade zone as a strategy to develop jobs?

220. The Report states that a FTZ must be managed properly; can the government describe what is meant by a “managed properly FTZ”?

221. “The implications from potential increased activity in a FTZ are far-reaching, including increased jobs, wages, GDP, economic output and government taxes.” Can the government explain how tax revenues will be increased?

222. The Report says that increased activity is beneficial for potential workers and their families, communities, and the economy of the province as a whole.” — How would this be beneficial if the government has not ascertained what Canadians really want?

223. Does the government believes that all activity generated from FTZs within BC would be of an incremental benefit to the province?

224. Through a FTZ what economic sectors does the government expect to be generated?

225. The federal government is increasing its numbers for temporary foreign workers, how many temporary foreign workers does government envision will be part of the success of the FTZ in British Columbia?

226. The Mayor of Ashcroft claims that he and his counsel have been corresponding with the government over the past two years to encourage an inter-modal facility in the interior, the report by InterVISTAS sites foreign trade zones for Vancouver, Prince Rupert, and Prince George, and makes no mention of either the Kamloops or Ashcroft areas. Why was Ashcroft not considered as an intermodal candidate within the Report?

227. What evidence is there to show that there would be no permanent displacement of the existing economic activity due to a FTZ?

228. The Report suggests that many firms can be transferred to a BC FTZ now conducting their operations overseas in Mexico. Does the government intend to create Mexican-styled FTZ’s in order to compete with developing economies?

229. The Report suggests “based on our analysis, in the Vancouver scenario, the medium employment scenario would result in an estimated $29 million increase federal tax revenue and $8 million dollars provincial tax revenues with forgone interest revenue that $3.1 million.” Is the government comfortable with these numbers?

230. Does $8 million increase in provincial revenue warrant a FTZ?

231. In a FTZ how much established property tax revenue will local governments lose?

232. The Report suggests that if a firm within a FTZ is unable to pay taxes from cash revenues they should get a interest rate holiday. Why would government enter into a FTZ scenario with such high-risk, and liability?

233. Can the government explain the following statement within the Report: “FTZs can only exist with incentives that are correct?”

234. The Report states another incentive is personal income tax relief for relocating key foreign personnel to BC. Why would government give relief to personnel outside of BC? Does the government believe that there are no capable British Columbians able to manage economies in BC?

235. The Report reveals that: BC needs “to provide input and guidance in the development of the policy” towards the development of FTZ’s in BC. Which Ministry’s are involved with the federal government to implement FTZ policy?

236. Will the Premier’s and intergovernmental relations play a part into FTZ policy formation, and if so how much?

237. Can the government provide calendars of meetings and all correspondence among stakeholders and the Government of Canada re discussions relative to a FTZ policy and strategy for BC?

238. In its Executive Summary conclusion, the report conveys: “The key issue of the development of a single window access service whereby FTZ applicants can deal with a single point person to handle all government issues regardless of source”. Is this referring to a one single window for all governments?

239. The request for proposals was jointly issued by the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Investment on February 22, 2011 seeking “to determine the feasibility of establishing a Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) program in British Columbia. One of the RFP calls was for primary research into “The potential benefits and losses to the province and the country associated with an FTZ program in B.C”. Did the province get value for money regarding a fair evaluation of the benefits and losses of a FTZ program for BC?

240. Another aspect of the RFP was to look at “Advantages and disadvantages of a location-specific FTZ in British Columbia vs. province-wide FTZ programs”. Did the province receive a thorough examination of all potential location specifics and dynamics re the advantages and disadvantages of placement?

241. The Report states that the purpose states that modern supply chains provide overseas firms with many options to structure operations to use the North American Free Trade Agreement marketplace. Does the government support the notion that NAFTA feeds the need for supply chain in foreign trade zones and can a foreign trade zone exist without NAFTA?

242. Does the government have evidence to support the claim: “In many ways, overseas production and rotation into the NAFTA countries, Canada, Mexico, and United States, is the simplest chain supply chain approach for overseas manufacturers”?

243. The Report continues: “This, however, may not be the least cost logistics solution. In many cases, it may be more effective to do final assembly and customization activities North America, and then shipped to the final destination.” What is the effect of domestic FTZ’s when overseas manufacturers’ are depressed?

244. The Report says that a British Columbia FTZ will beat the Americans “inverted tariff”, duties on parts” — Can the government assure the legislature that the US will not make changes to its own tariff and duty systems within its FTZ’s in competition with BC FTZ’s?

245. Cannot the American FTZ create a custom-made tax free foreign trade zone that will out-compete BC FTZ’s?

246. Report goes on to say that Canada and/or British Columbia can also serve the US market as a location for final assembly and customization. Can the government show how viable such an FTZ operation will be able to achieve this?

247. The Report also suggests that there is considerable paperwork involved in the processor must tie-ups could scarce cash in pre-paid duties here in Canada and BC. How is it then, that at times BC and took the Canada posts were the strongest economies in the G7? Policy, do you need a foreign trade zone to be competitive in the global world?

248. With regards to FTZ capabilities, the Report states on page 2: “the limited success of Canadian locations in attracting these types of value added activities the corresponding generation of local jobs is partially due to poor understanding of what is possible.” Can the government explain what is meant by poor understanding? What public relations strategies will the government employ and the expenditures involved to educate the public?

249. The Report states: “Stakeholders such as Canada’s ports and airports have long maintained the need for improved, invigorated Canadian foreign trade zone program.” How long have stakeholders, including the government crown corporations and agencies, including the Ministry of Transportation been advocating for a FTZ? What exactly is an invigorated Canadian foreign trade zone program?

250. The Report cites: “There is currently a high level of interest in the concept in BC and elsewhere in the country”. Can the government explain what represents a “high level of interest in a FTZ?”

251. How much high level of interest for a FTZ tied to the Asia-Pacific Gateway program?

252. Can the government list all federal government departments, municipal governments and First Nation whereby it has requested cooperation and consultation re the implementation of a FTZ?

253. Can the government explain what is meant by a “true” FTZ?

254. Within the following context as seen in the Report: “The government of BC needs to better understand the potential gains and losses should the federal government establish a new FTZ program” — What are the losses should a FTZ is established?

255. What is the “core principle of a FTZ”?

256. The Report refers to the core principle accordingly: “For some the theme has been trade globally, work and prosper locally” — who are the “some” that support this as a core principle?

257. The Report assumes that: “The basic objective of foreign trade zone is to attract economic committee that would otherwise take place overseas or at other locations.” Does the government believe that all economic activity spun through a FTZ is good for BC?

258. Can the government name some economic activities within a FTZ that may not be in the general interest of British Columbia?

259. In the Report, the purpose of a FTZ is “simplify complex regulations and administrative burden that discourages trade.” Can the government show how much deregulation will be induced through a FTZ and that it is in the best interest of the people of BC?

260. The Report states: “Canada is the only G8 country, and one of the only seven of the 29 organization for economic cooperation and development states, without active FTZs.” How is it that while Canada and British Columbia claim to be doing quite well during the economic crises worldwide that the government is adopting models of FTZ’s from countries that continue to have trade deficits and are still in recession?

261. On page 5, the Report refers to merchandise that will never enter domestic commerce and will be exclusively exported to another country with “no duties or taxes paid on those items” — Is this not a means to that end whereby a FTZ is a separate economic state within British Colombia?

262. How encompassing large will the FTZ be?

263. What on-going discussions have occurred among the provincial government, third parties such as private organizations, corporations, and other agencies regarding location of FTZ’s in BC?

264. Re goods that are to be value added, the Report states: “This processing might include activities such as final assembly … Manufacturing, etc.” — How certain is the government that a FTZ will trigger value added industry when the report says that a FTZ processing “might”?

265. Accordingly in the Report: “these finished goods are then exported to foreign markets, or they enter domestic commerce. If the finished goods are exported, then no duties or taxes are due” — is this implying that goods produced British Columbia for export and to be shipped for example to the United States will bear no taxes?

266. Does the above statement imply that duties and taxes will be charged by the US government and therefore revenue go to America not Canada?

267. If finished goods are not to be taxed, what benefit is a fFTZ to the people British Columbia?

268. On page 6 of the report says: “FTZs do not include exemption from environmental or labor law, immigration regulations, environmental and health regulations, income taxes, etc. All the taxes of Canada, federal, provincial and local, would apply to activity within the BC foreign trade zone.” Does this imply that all laws and statutes cannot be reformed to accommodate the needs of a foreign trade zone?

269. Some FTZs, especially in the United States, enjoy reduced or total exemption from local property taxes (p. 6). Realizing the reduction of property taxes for current port-related activities, how much reduction of property taxes would occur in order to make a FTZ successful?

270. Can the government guarantee that there would be no exemptions of laws or income tax etc. to accommodate a FTZ?

271. If a FTZ reduces property taxes, will the province consult and achieve permission by a host municipal government?

272. Will a FTZ offer wage subsidies? If so will these by federal or provincial programs? Can the government describe what a wage subsidy is within a FTZ?

273. Will labour safety, wage and benefit standards be different within a FTZ as compared to elsewhere in BC?

274. The Report refers to: “sweeteners” as a matter of “local decision”: What are sweeteners and are local decisions conducted by an authority within a FTZ or the host municipality?

275. The Report declares: “The concept of foreign trade zone is one of facilitating trade, typically including temporary duty and sales excise tax relief in her track jobs investment that would otherwise take place overseas or country” — can the government please explain the meaning of temporary tax relief?

276. How long is a temporary tax relief envisioned? — six months, a year, or two years, etc.? Who or what authority determines its longevity?

277. The FTZ model recommended in the report is to be exclusively non-sovereign foreign trade zones: “This is the model views United States goods in the foreign trade zone are temporarily exempt from duty and taxes, but all lands laws of land applied.” So what exactly is the difference a sovereign and non-sovereign foreign trade zone?

278. Does a temporary exemption from duty and tax laws determine the difference between a temporary non-sovereign FTZ and a sovereign FTZ?

279. The Report implies that all laws of land will; how will this apply when tax laws are to be changed within a FTZ?

280. The Report states: “Given a foreign trade zones and now operating US can serve as proxies it types activity that could take place in the Canadian of BC foreign trade zone, is useful to understand the US context.”

281. With the US market having a larger critical mass than Canada’s, can the government show evidence that a BC FTZ will work in parallel with the US?

282. If goods enter the US through a BC FTZ, how will domestic retailers capture the market advantage?

283. If goods enter the US through a BC FTZ, whereby US duties will apply: how will that deter cross-border shopping?

284. How much more border infrastructure improvements would be necessary to assist in higher cross-border activity due to a FTZ in BC?

285. The report asserts that US FTZ’s act as “proxies” for the activity that could occur in BC; therefore, how can a US FTZ act as a proxy when the US dictates the continental market?

286. FTZ status is granted by the for Trade Zone Board in United States to a grantee, typically a public or public type Corporation, example, port authorities, cities, time counties, economic not development organization or others.” What type of public Corporation would act as a grantee?

287. Accountability and transparency would come under the scrutiny of the provincial auditor general?

288. The Report suggests that: “Foreign trade zone board does not oversee day-to-day operations; operational responsibility rests with the grantee.” Does this not imply that foreign trade zones will be deregulated?

289. The Report, on page 8 states: “users of foreign trade zones must apply for and complete a rigorous application process and pay fees associated with applications, one time activation.” — What does rigorous mean? How are grant applications governed?

290. Are grants governed by the federal government, or by the local government, or by the provincial government?

291. In the report, InterVISTAS says that according to senior staff members of the American foreign trade zone boards, “potential impact foreign trade zone activities of domestic suppliers is examined closely in every application, and any evidence of a possible negative effect would lead the board to restrict or disapprove the application” — What is meant by “negative’?

292. Why would a FTZ board have an interest in the general needs of public disapproval that would restrict an application? Why would a negative aspect of a FTZ be conducted and concluded outside the public interest?

293. In the 2009 annual report of US FTZ board 2500 firms utilize FTZs and employs 330,000 people; however, how many people would’ve been employed without a FTZ?

294. Why isn’t the report more analytical and comparative rather than relying perspectives by American foreign trade zone board reviews?

295. The Report states: “Zone activities are clearly defined and can range from storage, assembly, processing, manufacturing distribution, all of which have undergone and are subject to continued public interest reviews.” What are these public interest reviews?

296. Are these reviews FTZ board driven or by an independent third party that has a direct mandate from the public?

297. In a FTZ what is considered a domestic market? What will used to measure a good’s place of origin? What review system will be used to monitor goods and their origin?

298. In the FTZ application process, there is to be a public hearing process where comments are made; however, how much authority does government have to overthrow the application based upon negative comments made by public?

299. How many of stakeholders and public interests will represented at the FTZ application process hearings?

300. The application process so far looks a general-purpose FTZs only — why?

301. What authority decides whether a public appeal process for a FTZ will be optional or non optional?

302. If through the FTZ application process the findings appear favorable towards the establishment of a FTZ, why is there no public appeal process available?

303. The Report states: “FTZ are secure not only by clearly defining secured boundaries with U.S. Customs oversight, but inventories recorded controlled using computer-based software that is reviewed by US customers.” The tracking will be conducted by what agency? What are the costs for monitoring? How much will the province bear?

304. The Report states: “Foreign trade zones usually are able to file only one entry summary per week rather than file a separate report each time a good unit is brought into the FTZ” — the streamlining procedure will be conducted by a private company or by government?

305. According to the Report’s Alternate Site Framework, it appears as though the FTZ will have governing authority. The Report avows: “users will no longer have to apply for sub-zone status, and local FTZ can enact user driven area of land that is off-site yet covered in the FTZ”: Does this not involve stewardship by the governing body of the FTZ to have almost limitless expansionist means?

306. Why was the Report’s scope so limited? Why did it only consult current FTZ operators in the US and not affected communities within American FTZ’s?

307. How critical was the InterVISTAS report regarding the assessment of the criminal activity in existing US West Coast FTZs?

308. Which policing and firefighting jurisdictions will be responsible for the security and enforcement within a FTZ?

309. How extensive was the data used in its comparative analysis on what the report dubbed “successful FTZ’s”?

310. Does the government agree that telephone interviews with stakeholders within competitive FTZ are the basis for objectivity?

311. The Report looked at the dollar value throughput and also collected data on total cargo and TE use handling at relevant ports and airports, but nothing on community infrastructure and community input — Why?

312. Many recommendations were made it is in the report, and yet the authors say, “consistent, verifiable, detailed the public data was largely unavailable” — How substantial are recommendations that are based on inconsistent, doubtful and inaccessible information?

313. In the Report why was there no information provided regarding economic, social and or environment for communities within and communities adjacent to FTZs?

314. The Report would not use “regression analysis” — why?

315. The Report states: “the purpose for countries to locate within a FTZ is varied and benefits differ according to location.” Does this mean therefore, that there is no viable location dynamic study available for establishing FTZs?

316. In assessing the potential impact of FTZs, the Report states it “created low, medium, and high case scenarios that reflect differing assumptions experience of US foreign trade zones.” Can the government explain what those assumptions are?

317. According to the Report” “These scenarios have been built using 95% confidence intervals to capture the potential spread in outcomes”. Does the Minister rely on this subjective use of confidence intervals to capture the potential for foreign trade zone scenario development in British Columbia?

318. Where will FTZs be located in BC?

319. The scenarios as outlined in the Report were “built upon three key elements”: total foreign trade zone throughput volume in dollars, the number of employees in each foreign trade zone, the total dollar value throughput of trade in corresponding trade districts as a foreign trade zones included in the analysis” — why didn’t the government adopt a triple bottom line approach?

320. The report calculated dollar value throughput per employee in each FTZ: “This approach allows the analysis to capture the diverse nature foreign trade zone operations sizes, while being able to represent the overall trends that identified in the US context.” Can the government explain what the economic trends that justify a foreign trade zone are?

321. The report says: “Regression analysis was not appropriate to employ given the limited number of observations” — therefore without regression analysis, how reliable is this report relative to the limited number of observations made?

322. The Report states: “The approach recognizes incorporates the underlying relationship that exists between labor and capital inputs producing output and merchandise” Does this not imply that there will be no fair wage guidelines within a FTZ?

323. How closely is the provincial government working with the federal government regarding the establishment of a FTZ?

324. The Report consistently refers to Port Metro Vancouver is BC’s primary southern gateway. Can the government give more specific information where in the lower mainland FTZs will be located?

325. The government supports the strategies of the Asia-Pacific Gateway and the assembly of land within the lower mainland in order to fulfill the desire for a FTZ; which Ministry is mandated to purchase land for Port Metro Vancouver industrial capacity?

326. How much land purchase is foreseen by the government of BC to fulfill the need of a FTZ?

327. The report estimates that with a FTZ within the vicinity of Port Metro Vancouver there’ll be $5.1 billion a throughput: Does the government agree and where is the information to support this claim?

328. The report uses “the same methodology as applied” for ascertaining successes of FTZs for Prince Rupert and Prince George: How can the government compare logistics and location dynamics of Prince Rupert and Prince George with the high real estate values found in the lower mainland?

329. Recently the Mayor of Ashcroft suggested that he has been in consultation the provincial government relative to the push for intermodal capacity in his area: Can the government provide all correspondence, reports and memos pertaining to intermodal capacity and discussions with the Village of Ashcroft?

330. The Report says that foreign trade zones and adjacent areas are having difficulty achieving goals of employment generation; why does the government embrace a foreign trade zone as a strategy to develop jobs?

331. The Report states that a FTZ must be managed “properly” — Can the government describe what is meant by a managed proper foreign trade zone?